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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the evolution of Keynesianism making use of concepts 
offered by Imre Lakatos. The Keynesian “hard core” lies in its views regarding 
the instability of the market economy, its “protective belt” in the policy strategy 
for macroeconomic stabilization using fiscal policy and monetary policy. 
Keynesianism developed as a policy program to counter classical liberalism, 
which attributes priority to the autonomy of the market economy and tries to 
limit the role of government. In general, the core of every policy program 
consists in an unfalsifiable worldview and a value judgment that remain 
unchanged. On the other hand, a policy strategy with a protective belt inevitably 
evolves owing to changes in reality and advances in scientific knowledge. This is 
why the Keynesian policy strategy has shifted from being fiscal-led to one that is 
monetary-led because of the influence of monetarism; further, the Great 
Recession has even led to their integration. 
 
Keywords: Keynesianism, classical liberalism, monetarism policy program, 
non-traditional monetary policy 
JEL Classification Numbers: B22, E00, E12, E52, E62 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
Keynesianism is a policy ideology that prescribes an active anti-cyclical government policy 
to stabilize an inherently unstable market economy, thereby achieving the desired levels of 
employment and income. Keynesianism was proposed as an antithesis to the classical 
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laissez-faire doctrine, under which a government does nothing to impede the autonomous 
adjustment mechanism of a market. This conceptual core of Keynesianism has not changed 
much since it was originally established. However, the policy strategy for attaining the 
desired employment and income under Keynesianism has changed over time. 
Most early Keynesians considered fiscal policy to be the main axis of macroeconomic 
policy, with monetary policy seen as playing a supplementary role. This view was based on 
skepticism about monetary policy and the recognition that the interest rate is money 
inelastic, while investment is interest-rate inelastic. By contrast, the early Keynesians had 
strong confidence in fiscal policy; this arose partly from their belief in the fiscal multiplier 
theory.  
This fiscal-led Keynesianism had largely lost force owing to the criticism of Keynesian 
economics by Milton Friedman and the subsequent “monetarist counter-revolution.” The 
emergence of high rates of inflation, beginning in the late 1960s, followed by stagflation in 
the 1970s, contributed to this shift from Keynesianism to monetarism. Although there are 
exceptions, fiscal policy had rarely been used as a stimulus measure since the 1970s. Under 
the influence of monetarism, the policy strategy in Keynesianism also shifted from fiscal to 
monetary policy. The result was that macroeconomic stabilization had been left almost 
exclusively to monetary policy. The era of the Great Moderation, from the latter half of the 
1980s to the first half of 2000s, represented the acme of this monetary-led Keynesianism. 
Owing to the global financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent Great Recession, policy 
strategy along the lines of Keynesianism underwent further transformation. It first changed 
from traditional monetary policy to the full utilization of non-traditional monetary policy. 
Further, it was accompanied by the integration of monetary and fiscal policies. The latter is 
also seen as a strategy against the global “austerity” imposed in response to the European 
sovereign debt crisis, which began in the spring of 2010. This flexibility of Keynesian 
policy strategy is the main reason for its amazing vitality as a policy program. 
 
 
II. Why Didn’t Keynesianism Die? 
 
 
It was at the end of the 1970s that Robert Lucas declared “the death of Keynesian 
economics” in his essay for graduate students at the University of Chicago; it began: 
 
The main development I want to discuss has already occurred: Keynesian 
economics is dead [maybe ‘disappeared’ is a better term]. I do not exactly know 
when this happened but it is true today and it was not true two years ago. This is a 
sociological not an economic observation, so evidence for it is sociological. For 
example, one cannot find a good, under 40 economist who identifies himself, works 
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as ‘Keynesian’. Indeed, people even take offence if referred to in this way. At 
research seminars, people do not take Keynesian theorizing seriously any more — 
audience starts to whisper and giggle to one another. Leading journals are not 
getting Keynesian papers submitted any more. 
I suppose I, and with many others, were in on the kill in an intellectual sense, but I 
do not say this as any kind of boast, or even with much pleasure. Just a fact. (Lucas 
2013, 500-501)  
 
It is apparent, at least in the academic world of economics, that this “sociological 
observation” of Lucas was neither a boast nor self-promotion. If a graduate student wanted 
to conduct research in the field of macroeconomics, he or she would usually be required to 
ignore Keynesian economics and follow, instead, the “new classical” macroeconomics 
developed by Lucas and other anti-Keynesian economists. 
However, Lucas’ prediction did not come true. Following the above victory declaration, 
Lucas stated: 
 
True, there are still leading Keynesians — in academics and government circles — 
so Keynesian economics is alive in this sense — but this is transient, because there 
is no fresh source of supply. The only way to produce a 60 year old Keynesian is 
to produce a 30 year old Keynesian, and wait 30 years. So the implications for 
policy will take a while to be evident — but they can be very accurately predicted. 
(Lucas 2013, 501) 
 
The subsequent turn of events belied this prediction in two ways. First, the idea of Lucas 
and the others certainly revolutionized macroeconomics, but did not exterminate the “30 
year old Keynesian.” In fact, a new generation of Keynesians, who came to be called the 
new Keynesians, appeared. Rather than abandoning Keynesian ideas and converting to the 
new classical school, they began to build the new Keynesian economics that incorporated 
ideas and analytical tools developed by the new classical economists. Second, even 30 or 
40 years after Lucas’ prediction, the new classical economists were never able to rule the 
policy world by displacing Keynesian economists. 
In his 2006 article titled “The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer,” Gregory 
Mankiw, who is one of the representatives of new Keynesian economics, stated that: 
 
Among the leaders of the new classical school, none (as far as I know) has ever 
left academia to take a significant job in public policy. By contrast, the new 
Keynesian movement, like the earlier generation of Keynesians, was filled with 
people who traded a few years in the ivory tower for a stay in the nation’s capital. 
Examples include Stanley Fischer, Larry Summers, Joseph Stiglitz, Janet Yellen, 
John Taylor, Richard Clarida, Ben Bernanke, and myself. The first four of these 
economists came to Washington during the Clinton years; the last four during the 
 
 
4 
Bush years. The division of economists between new classicals and new 
Keynesians is not, fundamentally, between the political right and the political left. 
To a greater extent, it is a split between pure scientists and economic engineers. 
(Mankiw 2006, 37) 
 
On this evidence, it does seem that the policy world is, after all, occupied almost 
exclusively by Keynesians, as was the case earlier. 
As the title of Mankiw’s paper suggests, he is likening the new classicals and new 
Keynesians to pure scientists and engineers, respectively. However, such a characterization 
is not necessarily appropriate. As is evident in the case of monetarism, there clearly existed 
a policy program and strategy based on classical thinking. It was the application to society 
of a doctrine that was derived from a certain value judgment, thereby taking on an obvious 
engineering aspect. The reality is that the social engineering of the classicals has 
disappeared, while that of the Keynesians has survived in the area of macroeconomic policy. 
The essential question to ask is why this happened. 
Keynesianism has shown an astonishing vitality in the policy world. This is because 
Keynesianism, at the level of policy program, is “progressive” in the sense that Imre 
Lakatos meant in the context of a scientific research program (Lakatos 1970). The 
progressiveness of a policy program means that it can continue to produce a new policy 
strategy that is applicable to whatever changes that occur in the real world, while 
maintaining its intrinsic worldview and value judgment. In a policy program, the worldview 
and value judgments are always at its hard core, and a policy strategy that can evolve with 
changing reality and newer knowledge is at its protective belt. The Keynesianism policy 
program is apparently progressive in this sense, for it continues to update its policy strategy 
in line with changing reality and newer knowledge. Such practicality and flexibility in 
Keynesianism is exactly what classical anti-Keynesian policy programs sorely lacked. 
In fact, Keynesian policy strategies have continued to change dramatically over time. 
The new classical macroeconomics emerged from the criticism of Keynesian economics. 
Naturally, Keynesians were initially antagonistic toward it. Before long, however, some of 
them began to accept the criticism of its weakness. They then began the endeavor to 
overcome its weakness by incorporating these new classical ideas and theories into the 
Keynesian policy program. As a result, the protective belt in Keynesian policy program has 
been constantly strengthened. As is shown in the following sections, Keynesian policy 
strategy evolved from an early fiscal-led Keynesianism to a monetary-led one, that is, from 
Keynesianism I to Keynesianism II. In recent years, Keynesianism II has undergone further 
transformation to achieve closer integration between deficit fiscal policy and monetary 
policy in its ideological battle against the austerity doctrine. 
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III. Historical Roles and Problems in Fiscal-Led Keynesianism 
 
1. Why Did the Early Keynesians Emphasize Fiscal Policy and not Monetary Policy? 
 
Keynesianism, when it initially found its way into policymaking, was dominated by fiscal 
policy. The impression is so strong that the notion prevails even today that a Keynesian 
policy is no more or less than an economic measure involving extended fiscal spending. 
However, Keynes’ own grasp of policy went much beyond fiscal spending. Had it not been 
the case, Keynes would not have gone into detailed discussion of “money” and “interest” in 
his General Theory (1936). Further, he would have been satisfied with simply presenting an 
income determination theory based on aggregate demand analysis centered on the fiscal 
multiplier theory, which we can see in Chapter 10 of his General Theory. 
In contrast, it is clear that many of the early Keynesians, who inherited Keynes’s thought, 
were skeptical about the effectiveness of monetary policy. This is because the Keynesians 
of that time thought that the effects of monetary policy were confined to a single channel, 
whereby a decline in interest rates would lead to an expansion of private investment. 
Contemporary economists know that monetary policy works on the real economy not only 
through the channel of interest rates, but also through other channels, such as exchange 
rates, asset prices (including stock prices), credit, expectations, and so on. However, the 
Keynesians of the time did not have this understanding. 
It is clear that monetary policy works on aggregate demand in a more indirect way than 
does fiscal policy. Further, the effectiveness of the interest rate channel seems very limited 
because it depends on the reduction in interest rate caused by the monetary expansion, as 
well as the expansion of private investment resulting from it. The elasticity of interest rate 
to money supply and that of investment to interest rate may not be enough. 
First, the interest rate is clearly not always elastic to the money supply. According to 
Keynes, interest is the price paid to relinquish liquidity. Therefore, when interest rates are 
low, people tend to prefer money – i.e. the most liquid asset. This means that the decline in 
interest rates becomes ever more moderate as the money supply increases. In other words, 
interest rates gradually become more inelastic to the money supply. When the interest rate 
is very low, it becomes completely inelastic. This is the “liquidity trap” that Keynes pointed 
out in Chapter 15 of General Theory. In a liquidity trap, the interest rate channel of 
monetary policy no longer works. 
Further, even if there is room for a decrease in the interest rate that is sufficiently elastic 
to the money supply, it is not always clear whether private investment would expand 
sufficiently as interest rates are reduced. A pessimistic finding regarding this is the famous 
Oxford Survey, which was conducted by an economic research group at Oxford University 
in the 1930s. According to the survey, firms’ investment decisions are hardly influenced by 
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interest rates at all.3 If this finding holds universally, it leads to the conclusion that the 
interest rate channel of monetary expansion cannot reliably lead to higher private 
investment, regardless of whether the economy is in a liquidity trap. The early Keynesians 
largely shared this understanding about the interest rate channel in monetary policy, which 
was often referred to as “elasticity pessimism”. 
On the other hand, the demand expansion effect of fiscal policy is obviously much more 
direct than monetary policy. In particular, government expenditure, such as public 
investment, leads to a direct increase in public demand. If fiscal policy is implemented 
through tax cuts or pecuniary benefits to households, it does not necessarily lead to a 
corresponding increase in private demand because there is a possibility that households will 
divert some of the increase in disposable income to savings, rather than consumption. Even 
in that case, if these public expenditures were financed by government deficit bonds instead 
of taxes, the increase in disposable income of households would lead to more consumption, 
which would in turn lead to an overall increase in demand in the economy. 
According to Keynesian economics, fiscal policy extends well beyond such direct 
spending by government and households as are covered by government bonds. It also has 
an expansive ripple effect through the chain of income and demand, which amplifies the 
demand and income of the economy. This is the multiplier theory that first appeared in 
Chapter 10 of the General Theory titled “The Marginal Propensity to Consume and the 
Multiplier”. Paul Samuelson reformulated the theory as the 45-degree line model, which 
became popular among the general public as a synonym for Keynesian economics. This 
45-degree line model or the fiscal multiplier theory is the basic theory that supports 
Keynesianism I, or fiscal-led Keynesianism. 
 
2. Significance of, and Problems in, Samuelson’s 45-Degree Line Model 
 
The 45-degree line model first appeared in Samuelson’s Economics, the first edition of 
which was published in 1948 (Samuelson 1997). The textbook achieved great commercial 
success. As a result, the 45-degree line model, which is the simplest Keynesian model, and 
the concept of the fiscal multiplier based on it, have become common knowledge among 
the general public with some economic literacy. In that sense, Samuelson’s Economics 
played an important role as a Keynesian evangelist. 
Samuelson’s 45-degree model is still frequently used in introductory classes in 
macroeconomics. It is certainly useful as an educational tool to show the interdependence 
of income and expenditure in the macroeconomy – that is, how someone’s income is the 
result of someone else’s spending. However, the model is rarely used as a tool by 
professional economists to conduct more formal research on policy analysis. This is 
 
3 On this point, see Meade and Andrews (1952, 28-30) 
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because its primary conclusion about the government’s fiscal spending bringing about a 
multifold increase in demand is hardly true in reality. 
The biggest problem with the 45-degree line model is its basic premise that people 
always use a certain percentage of their income for consumption, which was later called the 
Keynesian consumption function. Apparently, people’s actual consumption and savings 
behavior is not so simple; it depends on disposable income over longer time horizons. 
Instead of relying only on current income, it includes assets that have been saved so far and 
income that could be earned in the future. 
With these problems in mind, after Keynes economists tried to replace his treatment of 
consumption with something more realistic. The results were the permanent income 
hypothesis by Milton Friedman and the life cycle hypothesis by Franco Modigliani.4 The 
permanent income hypothesis proposes that our consumption depends not only on the 
current income, as Keynes assumes, but also on the permanent income, i.e. the expected 
long-term average income. The life cycle hypothesis proposes that our consumption 
depends on the lifetime income that each individual can earn in the course of his or her life. 
Both these hypotheses are applications of the fundamental economic principle that 
individuals maximize utility under the income constraints they face and choose to consume 
or save within their lifetime. 
The primary policy implication derived from Keynesian macroeconomic theory — the 
multiplier effect of the fiscal stimulus — depends on this very special setting of the 
Keynesian consumption function. In the multiplier theory, the ripple effect of consumption 
occurs because people are always assumed to divert a part of their increase in income to 
consumption. If people divert all their income increases to savings, rather than consumption, 
there is no consumption ripple effect at all. Of course, there are always some households 
that immediately consume the increase in income. However, this would probably be limited 
to poor households with few assets. In a typical household, with a certain amount of assets, 
the magnitude of consumption at each point in time would not necessarily depend on the 
current income. Considering these problems, it was clear from the outset that the fiscal 
multiplier theory based on the 45-degree line model should have been treated exclusively as 
an educational model rather than the reference model for actual macroeconomic policy. 
  
3. Demise of Fiscal-led Keynesianism 
 
Keynesianism I or fiscal-led Keynesianism calls for fiscal policy as a primal means of 
macroeconomic stabilization; it reached the height of its influence in the policy world in the 
first half of the 1960s. In Democrat John F. Kennedy’s administration, which took office in 
1961, leading Keynesian economists, such as James Tobin and Robert Solow, acted as 
 
4 The permanent income hypothesis and the life cycle hypothesis first appeared in Friedman (1957) and 
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policy advisers. The policy program they conducted was genuinely in the spirit of 
Keynesianism, and its policy goal of achieving full employment was clear evidence of this. 
Naturally, fiscal policy was assigned as the main means for achieving that goal. The theory 
related to this economic policy was termed the “New Economics”. 
The fiscal policy actually applied by the Kennedy administration was income tax 
reduction, known as the Kennedy tax cut, which was proposed by the Kennedy 
administration and implemented in 1964, after Kennedy’s assassination. In fact, many 
Keynesian economists in the administration advised Kennedy that fiscal expenditure was 
preferable to tax reduction for economic recovery. However, it was the tax reduction policy 
that Kennedy actually chose because he thought that the maximum US income tax rate of 
91% at that time was too high. 
The policy strategy characterized by Keynesianism I rapidly disappeared from the policy 
world at the end of the 1960s. This was mainly because monetarism, as an anti-Keynesian 
policy program, penetrated academia and the policy world around that time. The economic 
condition of the developed economies during this period, that is, high inflation as from the 
end of the 1960s and stagflation as from the 1970s, motivated the anti-Keynesian 
movement. Around 1980, the Thatcher administration in the United Kingdom and the 
Reagan administration in the US took office one after the other. This marked a major 
turning point in the history of economic policy, in that monetarism in the macroeconomic 
sphere and neoliberalism in the microeconomic sphere penetrated the real policy world. 
What must not be overlooked is the fact that the demise of Keynesianism I was already 
in progress within academia before monetarism began to influence the policy world. Even 
Keynesian economists began to avoid using bare fiscal multiplier theory relying on the 
Keynesian-type consumption function that lacks a micro foundation. Further, the dogma of 
preferring fiscal policy over everything derived from the former approach had often come 
to be viewed as “crude Keynesianism”. Robert Lucas’ “sociological observation” that 
attendees at economics seminars started to ignore Keynesian types of studies had already 
been noticed long before he wrote about it. 
In fact, the thinking behind Keynesianism I concepts came to be criticized in the late 
1960s not only by the anti-Keynesian monetarists, but also by some Keynesians. Axel 
Leijonhufvud, who was apparently one of the most influential adherents to the Keynesian 
camp at that time, stated: 
 
The discussion of the interest-elasticity of investment has proceeded within the 
debate over the efficacy of monetary policies in combating business fluctuations. 
Keynes’ pessimism on the latter issue and his propaganda for various fiscal policies 
were two of the most prominent features of the General Theory. In the hands of 
many early “Keynesians”, these elements of his thought hardened into simplified 
 
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), respectively. 
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dogmas — monetary policy came to be regarded as completely ineffective in 
recession while fiscal policies were propounded as the universal and only cure for 
macroeconomic problems. In the course of this evolution, there was an important 
change of emphasis in the explanation offered for the presumed inefficacy of 
monetary measures. It is this shift of emphasis which concerns us here. 
(Leijonhufvud 1968,158) 
 
In short, Leijonhufvud pointed out that fiscal-led Keynesianism, which was characteristic 
of early Keynesians, should be abandoned if Keynes’ original thinking was to be respected. 
 
 
IV. From Monetarist Counter-Revolution to Keynesianism II 
 
 
1. Monetarism as a Sub-Program of Classical Liberalism 
 
It was Milton Friedman, one of the founders of the Chicago school as a hub of 
neoliberalism, who launched monetarism as the anti-Keynesian policy program at a time 
when the policy sphere was ruled by Keynesianism I. Neoliberalism is essentially a 
sub-program of classical liberalism that attempts to restore liberalism in the classical sense 
through modernized policy strategies. It has created a global policy trend towards reducing 
the role of the government and increasing that of the market, especially as from the 1980s; 
market-oriented economic reforms, such as deregulation and privatization of public 
enterprises, have been extensively promoted.5 
While neoliberalism has made institutional reforms in the microeconomic area of the 
market a major policy issue, monetarism constructed a similar policy strategy, based on 
classical liberalism, in the area of macroeconomic policy. In fact, monetarism and 
neoliberalism share the core tenet of classical liberalism that the role of governments 
should be as limited as possible. Naturally, Keynesianism clashed with them because it 
originally emerged as a critique of classical liberalism. This is exactly the reason why 
monetarism is seen as a “counter-revolution” against the Keynesian Revolution. 
The shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in the real world came about in a very 
dramatic way. The birth of the Thatcher administration in the UK marked the beginning of 
the global conservatist revolution. Peter Hall, using his own concept of “policy paradigm”, 
described the situation thus: 
 
 
5 Authors define the term “neoliberalism” in many ways. Sometimes, it includes not only market liberalism 
or structural reform but also macroeconomic austerity policy. This study considers the neoliberalism and the 
macroeconomic austerity of the Austrian school as separate policy programs, although they share the hard 
core of classical liberalism. 
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Keynesians tended to regard the private economy as unstable and in need of 
government intervention; monetarists saw the private economy as basically 
stable and government intervention as likely to do more harm than good. 
Keynesians saw unemployment as a problem of insufficient aggregate demand, 
while monetarists believed that a “natural” rate of unemployment was fixed by 
structural conditions in the labor market that would be relatively impervious to 
reflationary policy. Keynesians regarded inflation as a problem arising from 
excess demand or undue wage pressures that might be addressed by an incomes 
policy; monetarists argued that inflation was invariably a monetary phenomenon 
containable only by controlling the money supply. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, then, Britain witnessed a shift in the basic policy 
paradigm guiding economic management. Thatcher's policies were not simply ad 
hoc adjustments to pieces of policy; they were rooted in a coherent vision 
associated with monetarist economics. Today mainstream economics has 
synthesized portions of both the monetarist and Keynesian paradigms. In the 
1970s, however, two competing doctrines contended for control over British 
policy, and the monetarist paradigm emerged victorious. (Hall 1992, 92) 
 
Hall’s understanding of Keynesianism and monetarism as two competing policy paradigms 
can be further clarified by using Imre Lakatos’ concept of “hard core” and “protective belt” 
for the two policy programs. 
As Hall says, Keynesians generally consider the market economy to be inherently 
unstable, while monetarists see it as stable. Thus Keynesians believe that the economy 
sometimes needs government intervention for stabilization. In contrast, monetarists hold 
that the economy is destabilized if there is arbitrary intervention by the government. These 
opposing worldviews of Keynesianism and monetarism are the “unfalsifiable hard core” of 
each policy program. They basically fall into the category of ideological “isms”, which are 
by no means falsifiable scientific propositions. After all, every economic policy, including 
Keynesianism and monetarism, has emerged from these unfalsifiable metaphysical 
worldviews and the value judgments linked to them. 
On the other hand, in the protective belt of each policy program, there is a policy strategy 
with a certain theoretical and empirical basis. As mentioned above, early Keynesians saw 
fiscal policy as the main policy tool for overcoming recession; to this, the fiscal multiplier 
theory provided support. Around the end of the 1960s, the focus of macroeconomic policy 
shifted to overcoming inflation, rather than recession. Some Keynesians then began to 
propose a wage control policy called “income policy” to contain inflation. 
Monetarists criticized this Keynesianism I policy strategy, and proposed an opposing 
policy strategy, namely rule-based monetary policy. Unlike Keynesians, monetarists do not 
think that recession is inevitable in the market economy. They believe that the market 
economy has an inherent ability to stabilize itself. According to them, the occurrence of a 
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serious recession is the result of government intervention distorting the normal operation of 
the market. 
A typical example of such thinking can be seen in A Monetary History of the United 
States; 1867-1960 (Friedman and Schwartz 1963). In Chapter 7, titled “The Great 
Contraction, 1929–33,” Friedman and Schwartz argue that the Great Depression was 
simply caused by a failure of the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. This contention 
virtually denies the Keynesian notion that the Great Depression was essentially a 
manifestation of the intrinsic instability of the market economy. 
The macroeconomic policy strategy derived from such thinking was rule-based monetary 
policy. According to monetarists, the market economy is basically stable, so there is no 
need to stabilize it by fiscal policy. The problem lies in monetary policy. In the first place, 
it is impossible for anyone other than the monetary authorities, i.e. the government or the 
central bank, to supply the market with the money that people need. Monetary authorities 
can either increase or decrease the money supply. If the authorities increase the money 
supply, then its value declines and inflation occurs. If they reduce the supply, deflation 
occurs, which, in turn, leads to a stagnant economy. According to monetarists, the main 
cause of macroeconomic instability is arbitrary monetary policy management by the 
monetary authorities. This leads them to their conclusion that it is necessary to impose a 
monetary policy rule on the monetary authorities instead of granting them discretion. 
 
2. Natural Rate of Unemployment Hypothesis and its Policy Implications 
 
It is Friedman’s natural rate of unemployment hypothesis that theoretically supports the 
monetarist policy strategy. The starting point was a critique of the traditional interpretation 
of the Phillips curve, proposed in his 1968 presidential address at the American Economic 
Association (Friedman 1968). Friedman then argued that the trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment, as described by the Phillips curve, only holds in the short run, when 
workers do not expect inflation; it does not hold in the long run, when inflation is factored 
into their expectation. 
Friedman assumes that there is a steady unemployment rate that is unrelated to the level 
of inflation, just as there is a neutral interest rate that does not cause inflation or deflation in 
the economy. Following Knut Wicksell, a Swedish monetary theorist, who named the 
neutral interest rate “the natural rate of interest”, Friedman called the steady unemployment 
rate of the economy as the natural rate of unemployment. 
Friedman argues that the actual rate of unemployment deviates from the natural rate 
because workers do not expect actual price changes and, thus, the rate of inflation people 
expect is different from the actual inflation rate. This is the reason why there is a trade-off 
between the actual inflation and the unemployment rate in the short run. However, if the 
actual inflation rate is incorporated into the inflation rate the people expect, the short-run 
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Phillips curve itself shifts, and the actual rate of unemployment returns to the initial natural 
rate. Therefore, the long-run Phillips curve becomes a vertical line at the level of the natural 
rate of unemployment. 
The monetarist policy strategy of making the monetary authorities follow a strict money 
supply rule is based on this natural rate of employment hypothesis. According to this 
hypothesis, the change in employment, that is, the divergence of the actual unemployment 
rate from the natural rate, is caused by the expectation error, which is the deviation of the 
expected inflation rate from the actual inflation rate. Therefore, it is important for 
employment stability to stabilize inflation at a certain level and to make the inflation rate 
the people expect match the actual inflation rate. To that end, it is desirable for the 
monetary authorities to increase the money supply at a fixed rate, such as k %, rather than 
increase or decrease the money supply arbitrarily. This is the “k % rule,” which was once 
synonymous with the monetarist policy strategy. 
 
3. Adaptation of Monetarism: From the Natural Rate to NAIRU 
 
Monetarism had been making rapid inroads into both academia and the world of policy 
makers since the late 1960s as inflation and stagflation became a global issue. In the 
academic world, the ideas of the monetarist counter-revolution were inherited by the 
rational expectation revolution, which evolved into the new classical macroeconomics. 
Keynesian economics had been supposed to have been eliminated from the forefront of 
macroeconomics. It was at that time that Robert Lucas proclaimed “the death of Keynesian 
economics”. 
However, monetarism could not ensure its own survival as a policy program. It certainly 
had a profound effect on macroeconomic policy during the two conservative regimes 
established around 1980, that is, the Thatcher and Reagan administrations. However, this 
was not only the first, but also the last time that monetarism affected actual macroeconomic 
policy. Since then, economists recognizing themselves as monetarists have dwindled in 
both academia and the world of policy. 
In contrast, Keynesianism as a policy framework has made its way through heavy critical 
fire and once again regained its earlier status as a driver of macroeconomic policy. This is 
because Keynesianism was able to evolve its policy strategy by heeding certain criticisms 
by the anti-Keynesian classical economists and incorporating their theories and policy 
ideas. 
A typical example of this Keynesian adaptation in response to critics’ views is the 
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) hypothesis proposed by Franco 
Modigliani and Lucas Papademos (1975).6  
 
6 NAIRU was originally named NIRU in Modigliani and Papademos (1975). 
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At first glance, NAIRU looks similar to the natural rate of unemployment. However, the 
logic behind it is very different, as shown by Tobin (1999). In Friedman’s view, a trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment occurs only when there is an expectation error. If it 
does not exist, a vertical long-run Phillips curve is established. The unemployment rate at 
that point is the natural rate of unemployment, as defined by Friedman. 
The NAIRU hypothesis, on the other hand, presumes that a Phillips curve has a near 
horizontal area and a near vertical area, depending on the size of the output gap. When the 
output gap is large, there might be a large amount of idle labor in the labor market. 
Therefore, the market impact of raising nominal wages and prices would not be so large 
even if the unemployment rate fell. When the output gap exceeds zero, however, the labor 
market could become tight owing to scarcity of idle labor. In such a situation, a minimal 
decline in the unemployment rate would see nominal wages and prices accelerating rapidly. 
NAIRU is the unemployment rate that is established exactly at this boundary between the 
horizontal area and the vertical area of the Phillips curve. 
The natural rate of unemployment hypothesis and the NAIRU hypothesis also differ in 
their policy implications. The primary condition for achieving the natural rate of 
unemployment is to make the expected inflation match the actual inflation, which is why 
monetarism proposed a rule-based monetary policy. 
In contrast, the NAIRU hypothesis has the following two policy implications. First, it 
suggests that the Keynesian policy for aggregate demand expansion accelerates the 
inflation rate in the vertical phase of Phillips curve; thus, it has little effect on reducing the 
unemployment rate. Second, it suggests that the Keynesian policy could bring about 
substantial improvement in employment and income without substantial inflation in the 
horizontal phase of the Phillips curve. 
The NAIRU hypothesis can be interpreted as a Keynesian adaptation of the natural 
unemployment rate hypothesis — a reconstruction of it as a theory protecting the hard core 
of Keynesianism. It partially accepts Friedman’s contention that a vertical Phillips curve 
would hold if the unemployment rate reached its structural level. On the other hand, it 
reveals that macroeconomic policy could be useful as long as the unemployment rate has 
not reached that structural level; further, NAIRU is the limit up to which it could be useful. 
In that sense, the NAIRU hypothesis played a role in protecting the core notion of 
Keynesianism that has focused on employment and income stabilization with the 
application of macroeconomic policy. 
 
4. Transformation of Keynesianism Triggered by New Classical Macroeconomics 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, when Keynesianism directly confronted monetarism, an 
understanding common to both policy programs was that Keynesianism aimed to realize 
employment expansion through fiscal policy, while monetarism sought to realize the 
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stabilization of general prices through monetary policy. In the wake of criticism by 
proponents of monetarism, however, Keynesianism began to reformulate the policy strategy 
as part of its protective belt. While maintaining the core value judgment that the economy 
always needs macroeconomic stability, more emphasis was placed on stabilization of the 
inflation rate. Further, the focus was brought to bear more on monetary policy than on 
fiscal policy. This adds up to Keynesianism II. 
This new direction of Keynesian policy strategy was, in part, a result of what was going 
on in the academic world. It saw the rise of a new Keynesian economics that was developed 
after borrowing some notions from the new classical macroeconomics. Thus, Gregory 
Mankiw and David Romer, who represent the new Keynesians, stated that “much of new 
Keynesian economics could also be called new monetarist economics” (1991, 3). 
Keynesians and monetarists were initially in conflict over the “discretion or rule” needed 
to conduct macroeconomic policy. Keynesians considered that the government could 
achieve nothing without using discretion in its policy decisions to stabilize the volatile 
market. Monetarists thought that such arbitrary policy decisions of the government were the 
primary reason for market instability. This conflict was resolved after the rational 
expectations theory, which followed monetarism and clarified the role of “expectations” in 
macroeconomic policy. However, this was not because Keynesians were convinced by the 
new classical macroeconomists’ doctrine that stabilizing expectations would naturally 
stabilize the economy. Instead, Keynesians realized that some control of people’s 
expectations is also necessary to make macroeconomic policy effective. 
The vital difference between discretion and rule in macroeconomic policy lies in the 
predictability of the policy. In the case of discretionary policies, people cannot accurately 
predict them. If policies are set in advance as rules, people can foresee, to some extent, 
what the government will do. Further, if the government carries out ad hoc policies that are 
not based on rules, their results will be less predictable, which, in turn, will make them less 
effective.7 This means that government policies must not be unpredictable, even if the 
market economy itself is unforeseeable. 
However, Keynesians and the new classical macroeconomists have basically different 
worldviews on the economy. Thus, even if the two groups superficially appear to be close, 
there will always remain essential differences between the two policy strategies. For 
example, there is an apparent difference in the way these two camps grasp policy rules. 
First of all, monetary policy rules in Keynesianism cannot be as mechanical as the k% 
rule in monetarism. In monetarism, a mechanical monetary rule of the kind is both 
necessary and sufficient for macroeconomic stabilization; this is because the central bank’s 
arbitrary monetary policy is the main source of destabilization in the economy. In contrast, 
Keynesians hold the view that the market economy has an inherently unstable characteristic 
 
7 These problems are generally referred to as dynamic inconsistency, the notion first presented by Kydland     
 
 
15 
because the investment demand of enterprises as well as the aggregate demand of the 
economy as a whole is based on entrepreneurs’ capricious investment decisions. Therefore, 
it is necessary for central banks to embark on active policies that offset fluctuations in 
private demand, rather than sticking to conservative policy rules. In other words, the central 
banks have to expand the money supply more vigorously when private demand is 
shrinking; similarly, they have to reduce it when the economy is overheating owing to the 
expansion of private demand. Thus, the rule that is needed is not a mechanical one, such as 
the k% rule, which pays no attention to the prevailing economic conditions, but a 
state-dependent policy rule that adjusts policies according to them. 
It was John Taylor who formulated a Keynesian-type monetary policy rule (Taylor 1993). 
According to the Taylor rule, as it is called, the central bank decides the policy interest rate 
on the basis of two variables indicating the macroeconomic situation; these are “the size of 
the output gap” and “the deviation of the inflation rate from its target level”. Output gap 
and inflation rate are the most basic economic indicators that show whether the economy is 
stagnating or overheating. Further, the policy rate is the most basic policy instrument that 
central banks use to ease or tighten money. This means that the Taylor rule is precisely the 
Keynesian monetary policy rule that central banks adjust monetary policy according to 
existing macroeconomic conditions. 
With the development of new Keynesian economics, Keynesian policy strategy has 
evolved to a monetary policy based on the framework of inflation targeting. 
Macroeconomic stability in Keynesianism means achieving the potentially attainable 
income and employment by bringing the output gap as close to zero as possible; at the same 
time, price stability is realized by stabilizing the inflation rate. This is equivalent to 
achieving the lowest unemployment rate that does not accelerate inflation, or in other words 
NAIRU. Further, it is also equivalent to achieving the lowest inflation rate that does not 
further expand unemployment.8 Because of this, the major central banks have usually set 
their target inflation rate at around 2%. 
The basic idea behind inflation targeting is constrained discretion, which is another 
expression of the state-dependent flexible rule described above. Inflation targeting requires 
central banks to achieve and maintain the target inflation rate. However, it does not impose 
mechanical rules on the policy operation. In order to achieve and maintain the target 
inflation rate, the central bank needs to adjust its policy interest rate according to the output 
gap and inflation trends, as the Taylor rule suggests. However, the decision is left to the 
discretion of central banks. This is what is meant by constrained discretion. 
Inflation targeting is the new protective belt in Keynesianism II that was triggered by the 
monetarist counter-revolution and the rational expectations revolution. It was the most 
 
and Prescott (1977). 
8 A theoretical foundation for the view that the optimal inflation rate is not 0%, but a positive value around 
2% was presented by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996). 
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refined form of policy strategy in Keynesianism II at this stage. 
 
 
V. The Great Recession and New Policy Strategy of Keynesianism II 
 
1. Changes of Macroeconomic Policy during the Great Recession 
 
Keynesianism II, which follows the traditional monetary policy of adjusting the policy 
interest rate according to the economic situation, enjoyed its heyday during the so-called 
Great Moderation. This was the period from the mid-1980s to the 2008 financial crisis; the 
term became popular after Ben Bernanke, then a governor of the US Federal Reserve, used 
it in a speech (Bernanke 2004). During that period, economic growth with moderate 
inflation and relatively small fluctuations in the economy was achieved in many developed 
economies. As Bernanke stated in the speech, monetary policy was apparently one of the 
key factors that brought about such moderation in the global economy. 
The global financial crisis that began in September 2008 and the subsequent global 
downturn — called the Great Recession — changed the situation. Since then, the policy 
interest rate has fallen to the lowest bound in many countries. This means that the central 
banks lost the room for implementing traditional monetary policy. As a result, some central 
banks have shifted to non-traditional monetary policies, such as quantitative easing. In the 
fiscal sphere, many countries initially implemented expansionary fiscal policies, in a 
throwback to Keynesianism I. However, in the wake of the Greek crisis in the spring of 
2010 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone countries, these 
expansionary fiscal policies were abandoned in rapid succession. Instead, fiscal austerity 
was adopted worldwide. 
This austerity policy, as a backlash against Keynesian fiscal expansion, led to serious 
delays in the recovery of the global economy. The major victims of austerity were the 
Eurozone debt-crisis countries, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, where unemployment 
increased rapidly, especially among the youth. This economic stagnation caused by 
austerity policies, and the resulting desolation of the economies, have since gone under the 
epithet of “austerity fatigue”. 
The worldwide “anti-austerity” tide arose under such circumstances. The movement is 
very complicated, transcending political groups on the right and left. However, it has a 
common economic policy slogan, namely, anti-austerity. 
 
2. From Traditional to Non-Traditional Monetary Policy 
 
Traditional monetary policy and non-traditional monetary policy are distinguished by the 
fact that central banks do not use the policy interest rate as the operational target of 
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monetary policy in the latter. Traditional monetary policy seeks to stabilize employment, 
prices and income by manipulating the policy interest rate. In contrast, non-traditional 
monetary policy uses means other than policy interest rates to achieve the same purpose. 
As mentioned above, the financial crisis that started in the fall of 2008 and the 
subsequent global recession forced the major central banks to embark on massive monetary 
easing to restore stability in the financial market and prevent a further dip in the economy. 
As a result, some central banks fell into a “liquidity trap”, that is, the lowest bound of the 
policy interest rate, wherein traditional monetary policy can no longer work. 
Non-traditional monetary policy was a natural outcome. 
It was Ben Bernanke who played the most important role in the development of both the 
theory and practice of non-traditional monetary policy. Prior to joining the Federal Reserve, 
Bernanke had published a paper titled “Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced 
Paralysis?” (Bernanke 2000). In the late 1990s, the Japanese economy had already faced a 
liquidity trap, long before the developed economies’ experience since 2008, owing to the 
long-term stagnation accompanied by deflation. However, the Bank of Japan chose policy 
inaction, arguing that monetary policy could do nothing once it reached the lowest bound of 
the policy interest rate. Criticizing this view, Bernanke argues, “despite the apparent 
liquidity trap, monetary policymakers retain the power to increase nominal aggregate 
demand and the price level” (Bernanke 2000, 158). 
In his article, Bernanke presented viable monetary policy options under a liquidity trap. 
The most important of them were “nonstandard open-market operations” by central banks. 
It was this idea that led to the practice of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs), commonly 
referred to as quantitative easing, about ten years after. 
Under the liquidity trap, central banks cannot lower the policy interest rate, no matter 
how much money they pump into the system. However, if the central bank expanded the 
base money by purchasing “nonstandard” assets that were not substitutes for money, the 
asset market would definitely be affected. This mechanism is generally called portfolio 
rebalancing. Underlying the idea is the general equilibrium analysis of the asset market 
which was proposed by James Tobin (Tobin 1969). In short, the quantitative easing policy 
affects employment and prices through the rise in asset prices caused by portfolio 
rebalancing. 
Bernanke launched the LSAPs program during the subsequent global economic crisis. As 
to the policy, he placed the greatest emphasis on this asset channel that is based on portfolio 
rebalancing. In a speech given at Jackson Hole in August 2012, Bernanke explained the 
mechanism of the policy as follows. 
 
Federal Reserve purchases of mortgage-backed securities (MBS), for example, 
should raise the prices and lower the yields of those securities; moreover, as 
investors rebalance their portfolios by replacing the MBS sold to the Federal 
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Reserve with other assets, the prices of the assets they buy should rise and their 
yields decline as well. Declining yields and rising asset prices ease overall 
financial conditions and stimulate economic activity through channels similar to 
those for conventional monetary policy. (Bernanke 2012, 4) 
 
If the central bank purchases various assets owned by private financial institutions and 
supplies the base money, the price of risk assets, including stocks, rises and the exchange 
rate depreciates as a result of portfolio rebalancing. A rise in stock prices means that the 
expected return on investment outweighs the cost of the investment, leading to investment 
expansion. If the exchange rate of the home currency falls, the production of the export 
industry and the industry making import substitutes expands. An increase in land prices 
means an increase in the value of real assets held by companies and households, which 
contributes to an increase in their expenditure. Therefore, the quantitative easing policy has 
the effect of stimulating economic activity. 
The expansionary effect of monetary policy through the interest rate channel does not 
work in the liquidity trap. However, the effects through asset prices, such as that of stocks, 
exchange rates, and land, remain. This is why Bernanke stated that a non-traditional 
monetary policy is as effective as a conventional monetary policy. 
 
3. New Role of Monetary Policy in Allowable Fiscal Deficit  
 
Keynesianism generally advocates a policy vision wherein governments actively implement 
counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies to achieve macroeconomic stability of the 
economy. An important corollary derived from this vision is the notion of allowable fiscal 
deficit, which states that the government’s fiscal balance should be realized through the 
course of the entire business cycle and not within each accounting period; thus, a temporary 
deficit during a recession is allowable. This notion has existed as a policy strategy of 
Keynesianism since it took shape.9 However, the Greek crisis and the European sovereign 
debt crisis that followed cast serious doubts on the validity of this notion, for the crisis 
seemed to have been caused by unhindered deficit expansion during the recession. 
This shows that the notion of allowable fiscal deficit was not well-grounded. From a 
Keynesian perspective, fiscal deficits during recession should be allowed as much as 
possible. However, once the deficit actually grows, fiscal concern inevitably arises. Further, 
there is no denying that what began as concern might eventually turn into a real crisis. This 
is exactly why many countries made what turned out to be the worst choice — austerity 
during recession. 
 
9 This idea began with Keynes’ criticism of the “Treasury View”. Lundberg (1985, 8) noted that the idea of a 
cyclical budget balance was first proposed by Gunnar Myrdal in his Appendix to the Swedish government’s 
fiscal program of January 1933. The notion was further developed by Abba Lerner, as his theory of functional 
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An expansionary monetary policy was necessary to avoid making such a choice. The 
following are three measures that would have helped avoid a debt crisis. 
The first is stabilization of the government bond market through the purchase of 
government bonds by the central bank. Monetary easing by the central bank generally 
involves purchasing government bonds and increasing supply of the local currency. During 
a recession, government bond issuance usually increases owing to a decrease in tax 
revenues and the fiscal spending required for economic stimulus. This can sometimes 
disturb the bond market. However, if the central bank implements monetary easing through 
the purchase of government bonds, the disturbances in the government bond market can be 
suppressed. 
The second is reduction of government bond interest payments through expansion of the 
central bank’s bond-holding; if the government issues bonds to cover the budget deficit, it 
must continue to pay interest to government bond-holders in the private sector. However, if 
the central bank buys the government bonds, the government can escape its interest 
payment obligations, for the interest payments on government bonds held by the central 
bank return to the government’s coffers. Therefore, if the central banks expand their 
holdings of government bonds, the government's interest payments to the private sector as a 
whole necessarily decrease. Because holding debt entails the necessity to pay interest, the 
government debt held by the central bank is virtually equivalent to the absence of 
government debt. This is what is known as seigniorage. 
The third is the fiscal improvement through economic recovery induced by monetary 
easing. Monetary easing generally improves employment, income, and corporate earnings 
through various channels. Because tax revenue is dependent on household income and 
corporate earnings, the improvement in income and corporate earnings naturally leads to 
improvement in tax revenue, which had decreased owing to the recession. 
In principle, the autonomy of monetary policy means that the government’s fiscal 
balance can be delayed longer than would be possible without autonomy.10 The European 
countries, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy, which faced fiscal crisis have 
forgone monetary autonomy with unification in the euro. Actually, it was probably no 
accident that all these debt-crisis countries joined the Eurozone. In this respect, the 
European sovereign debt crisis was not a problem of fiscal discipline, but a problem of the 
“euro fetters,” that is, the result of countries participating in the monetary unification 
project being deprived of monetary autonomy. 
 
 
 
finance (Lerner 1943). 
10 Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), proposed around the middle of the 1990s, representatively by Warren 
Mosler and Randall Wray, maintains that there is no government fiscal constraint in an economy with a 
sovereign currency. See Wray (2015). 
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4. Friedman-Bernanke Helicopter Money 
 
The combination of a policy of monetary easing and deficit fiscal policy is not new in itself. 
It is a policy that has been discussed as “money finance”, or “helicopter money”. The 
novelty is that this integrated strategy is positioned as a realistic policy plan against 
austerity, and not just as a fable in economics. 
Bernanke, the then Fed governor, gave a talk in November 2002 entitled “Deflation: 
Making Sure ‘It’ Doesn't Happen Here” (Bernanke 2002). The background to this talk was 
the US economy in recession at the time owing to the collapse of the IT dotcom bubble, the 
inflation rate dropping sharply. The then Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan, feared that the US 
would fall into a deflation similar to that in Japan (Greenspan 2007, 228). Were it to happen 
in the US, Bernanke proposed the following policy option: 
 
In practice, the effectiveness of anti-deflation policy could be significantly 
enhanced by cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities. A 
broad-based tax cut, for example, accommodated by a program of open-market 
purchases to alleviate any tendency for interest rates to increase, would almost 
certainly be an effective stimulant to consumption and hence to prices. Even if 
households decided not to increase consumption but instead re-balanced their 
portfolios by using their extra cash to acquire real and financial assets, the 
resulting increase in asset values would lower the cost of capital and improve the 
balance sheet positions of potential borrowers. A money-financed tax cut is 
essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman's famous "helicopter drop" of money. 
(Bernanke 2002, 3-4) 
 
This observation earned Bernanke the nickname “Helicopter Ben”.  
Friedman’s helicopter money argument appeared in his article titled “The Optimum 
Quantity of Money” (Friedman 1969). In order to show what happens when the quantity of 
money is expanded, Friedman proposed a thought experiment involving a helicopter that 
dropped banknotes over people’s heads. The result is, of course, a rise in prices. Bernanke 
simply adapted this idea to propose a policy that prevents deflation. 
Helicopter money is, in short, the policy to cover government fiscal spending not with 
government bonds, but with the central bank’s money. In order to achieve this, the central 
bank has to buy the deficit bonds issued by the government and supply the base money to 
the market. Although the underwriting of government bonds by the central bank is legally 
prohibited in many countries, the central bank can purchase the same amount of 
government bonds from private financial institutions. As a result, the money held by private 
enterprises and households increases by the amount of the base money supplied by the 
central bank, without decreasing other assets held by the private sector. The result is exactly 
the same as that achieved by “dropping money from a helicopter”. 
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The helicopter money policy, or money finance, was counted among the most unsound 
economic policies that would necessarily lead to uncontrollable inflation. It is now seen as 
a serious policy option for coping with the secular stagnation that has emerged since the 
Great Recession.11 
  
VI. The Hard Core and Protective Belt of Keynesian Policy Program 
 
Keynesianism is a policy ideology stating that the market economy needs positive 
counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy to stabilize the inherently unstable market economy. 
The core of Keynesianism consists in this vision and the related value judgment that 
macroeconomic stability, especially the stability of income and employment, is important. 
This core does not change as long as Keynesianism endures. 
On the other hand, the protective belt of Keynesianism consists in its policy strategy: 
specific policy targets and instruments for securing macroeconomic stability. This policy 
strategy changes with changing realities and the acquisition of newer knowledge. To 
correctly understand the causal relationship between policy target and its instruments, it is 
necessary to infer it on the basis of a revised and more reliable scientific theory. However, 
just as every scientific theory inevitably changes with the progress of theoretical and 
empirical research, so must policy strategy. 
The initial Keynesian policy strategy that relied mostly on fiscal policy lost potency 
precisely for this reason. It reflected the changes that occurred in the intellectual domain of 
economics. Nevertheless, Keynesianism as policy program survived. Robert Lucas’ 
prophecy that Keynesianism would die in the policy world, as well as academia, was not 
fulfilled. Rather, it was monetarism that died out. This is because Keynesianism was able to 
evolve its policy strategy into something more realistic by incorporating the theoretical 
tools proposed by its critics. 
The vitality present in Keynesianism was never to be found in anti-Keynesian policy 
programs, such as monetarism and the Austrian school. The differences probably come 
from the degree of “realism” that these programs incorporate. 
At the core of anti-Keynesian programs, such as monetarism and the Austrian School, is 
the idea inherited from classical liberalism that the market economy is inherently stable, 
and that the government always tends to destabilize it. Such a view of the world inevitably 
leads to a policy strategy that tends to narrow the scope of the government’s policy as much 
as possible. Some examples are the k% rule for monetarism and the restoration of the gold 
standard favored by the Austrian school. However, it became apparent after all that these 
policies could not achieve the results to which our society aspires. 
Keynesianism started with criticism of this worldview of classical liberalism. It sees the 
 
11 A leading advocate of modern helicopter money policy is Adair Turner. See Turner (2016). 
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market economy as a highly volatile economic system; it is marked by unavoidable 
uncertainty, as well as income and employment fluctuations, caused by fluctuations in 
demand. Keynesianism supposes that depression is a manifestation of this essential attribute 
of the market economy. When such economic turmoil occurs, therefore, Keynesianism 
supposes that the government as an agent entrusted with the public’s interest should 
definitely intervene in the economy to improve the situation, rather than sit and wait for 
disaster. 
Unfortunately for our society, this vision at the core of Keynesianism has proved to be all 
too realistic. Depression has always arrived when society forgot about it. And the aspiration 
to overcome it has remained. On such occasions, our society has had to find some way of 
coping with the situation. To this end, Keynesianism has proved the only valid approach. 
And this, indeed, is the most important reason why Keynesianism eventually survived. 
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